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1. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between behavioural 
psychology and artificial intelligence is 
reciprocal: just as AI researchers can apply 
lessons from psychology to artificial behaviour, 
psychologists can apply lessons from AI to 
human behaviour. In some cases these 
interactions will have a cyclic structure, with 
one discipline inspiring new ideas in the other, 
then those ideas in turn being taken up by the 
original discipline. Although this reciprocal 
arrangement has yielded a wealth of results, 
there are doubtless a vast range of lessons that 
remain unrecognised. Put another way, there are 
surely insights in each discipline that could be 
fruitfully taken up by the other, but which have 
not yet been extracted. My aim in this paper is 
extract one such lesson from AI and to present 
some proposals about how it might be applied to 
human behaviour. I start with an insight from 
psychology – the role of affordance perception 
in human behaviour – and consider how this 
insight has stimulated new ideas in AI. I then 
consider how one of these ideas – Raubal’s [6, 
7] notion of mental affordances in robotics – 
moves beyond the understanding of affordances 
offered by psychologists. Finally, I explore how 
the notion of mental affordances might be 
applied in human psychology, and how it might 
be further developed in AI. 
 
2. APPLYING AFFORDANCE THEORY TO AI 
The concept of affordances was introduced by 
the ecological psychologist J.J. Gibson, and his 
most fully developed articulation of the concept 
can be found in his 1979 work The Ecological 
Approach to Visual Perception [2]. In that book, 
Gibson explains the concept of affordances as 
follows: 
The affordances of the environment are what 
it offers the animal, what it provides or 
furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to 
afford is found in the dictionary, but the 
noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I 
mean by it something that refers to both the 
environment and the animal in a way that no 
existing term does. It implies the 
complementarity of the animal and the 
environment.’ [1, p.127] 
Classic cases of affordances are those pertaining 
to basic bodily actions such as walking, gripping 
or catching. A pathway might afford walking, a 
stick might afford gripping and a ball might 
afford catching. Whether something has these 
affordances depends on the body and the 
abilities of the agent: a ball that affords catching 
for one agent might not afford catching for 
another. 
At the heart of the concept of affordances is a 
specific understanding of the relationship 
between action and perception. Gibson’s key 
theoretical claim is that agents do not perceive 
an action-neutral environment then infer what 
actions are available to them in an environment 
of that description. Instead, agents can simply 
perceive opportunities for action.  
For Gibson, this claim was part of a radical 
understanding of behaviour according to which 
internal processes are unnecessary for 
perception, or for the transition from perception 
to action. Agents can pick-up affordances by 
directly perceiving optical patterns in the 
environment, and these affordances can directly 
guide action without the need for mediating 
processes. 
Some in the ecological school of psychology 
have sought to retain this radical understanding 
of behaviour. However, the majority of those 
who have taken up Gibson’s concept of 
affordances have left these wider claims behind. 
AI is no exception to this. Horton et al [2] note 
that AI researchers understand affordance 
perception in terms of internal representations of 
opportunities for action. But if perceiving and 
acting on affordances is taken to require internal 
representation, what value is there in the 
concept? Horton et al outline the application of 
affordances to AI as follows: 
In designing artificial agents, several 
successful patterns for control and 
coordination of perception and action have 
emerged. Some of these approaches share an 
important characteristic - a clear emphasis on 
utilizing the environment, and the agent’s 
interaction with it, to reduce the complexity 
of representation and reasoning. This 
characteristic is founded on an ecological 
view of the agent - an entity embodied in a 
world rich with observable cues that can help 
guide the agent’s behavior. [2, p.71] 
By programming behaviour in a way that’s 
sensitive to environmental affordances, one can 
thus mimimize the need for internal 
representations. This is a valuable result even if 
the Gibsonian dream of eliminating internal 
processing entirely is deemed implausible [2, 
p.79]. An especially interesting consequence of 
affordance-based programming is that agents 
engage in exploratory behaviour. This behaviour 
is not directed toward any specific goal, but by 
interacting with items in the environment in a 
range of ways the agent discovers the 
opportunities for action presented by that object, 
and by other objects of the same kind. Stoytchev 
[3], for instance, offers a distinctive approach to 
tool-learning in robotics that involves the robot 
engaging in random ‘dabbling’ behaviour 
toward a presented tool. The robot performs a 
variety of random actions on the tools and learns 
the results of these actions. By engaging in this 
behaviour, the robot is then able to perform a 
tool-using task that they would have been unable 
to perform without the lessons acquired from 
their goal-independent exploration. 
 
3. MENTAL AFFORDANCES IN AI 
The affordances discussed by Gibson (and by 
the vast majority of those who have picked up 
on his term) are affordances for bodily action. 
As mentioned above, classic affordances include 
affording walking, affording gripping and 
affording catching. The affordances explored in 
AI research are almost universally affordances 
for bodily action in the sense that they involve 
some kind of physical movement on the part of 
the artificial agent (whether it might be virtual 
movement in simulation or actual movement 
through an artificial body). Examples include 
affordances for poking, pushing, pulling, 
rotating and lifting [2, p.73]. However, in a 
small number of cases AI researchers talk about 
affordances for mental action. Consider the 
following passage from Raubal & Moratz: 
…a public transportation terminal affords for 
a person to enter different buses and trains. It 
also affords to buy tickets or make a phone 
call. A path affords remembering and 
selecting,  a  decision  point  affords  
orienting  and  deciding,  etc. In general, 
such situations offer for the person the 
mental affordance of deciding which of the 
perceived affordances to utilize according to 
her goal. [4, p.3] 
Some of the affordances cited in this passage are 
affordances for bodily actions, such as the 
bodily act of getting on a specific bus. But the 
‘mental affordances’ are affordances for mental 
action, such as the mental act of deciding what 
to do. Raubal & Moratz offer an affordance-
oriented robot architecture that includes 
sensitivity to these mental affordances. They 
explain this architecture as follows: 
Mental affordances (Maff) arise for the agent 
when perceiving a set of physical and social-
institutional affordances in an environment 
at a specific location and time. Affordances 
offer possibilities for action as well as 
possibilities for the agent to reason about 
them and decide whether to utilize them or 
not, i.e., mental affordances. The agent needs 
to perform an internal operation Op (Int) to 
utilize a mental affordance.  Internal 
operations are carried out on the agent’s 
beliefs (including its history and 
experiences) and lead to an internal outcome 
O (Int). In order to transfer such outcome to 
the world, the agent has to perform an 
external operation Op (Ext), which then 
leads to an external outcome O (Ext), i.e., 
some change of the external world. [4, 95-
96] 
So besides being sensitive to specific 
affordances for physical action, the robot is 
sensitive to situations in which a decision is 
required [4, 5]. The opportunities for physical 
action can be understood as first-order 
affordances. The situations in which a decision 
is required can be understood as second-order 
affordances, as they are affordances to decide 
between first-order affordances. Raubal & 
Moratz argue that this architecture better enables 
robots to respond to a dynamic environment and 
allows them to communicate plans before they 
are acted upon. Although they don’t draw 
explicitly on Raubal & Moratz, Saratha & 
Scheutz have also recently argued that uptake of 
such second-order affordances enhances 
performance in various ways [6]. 
 
4. MENTAL AFFORDANCE IN PSYCHOLOGY 
Raubal & Moratz [4] emphasise that one of the 
advantages of their mental affordance-based 
architecture is that it better corresponds to the 
architecture of human behaviour. However, 
when we look at how the concept of affordances 
is used in the psychology literature, we find no 
reference to affordances for mental actions such 
as deliberating. Psychology did AI a service 
with the notion of affordances, and perhaps here 
AI can return the favour. I propose that the 
notion of mental affordances opens up a range of 
promising avenues of enquiry for the 
understanding of human behaviour. 
Raubal & Moratz’s [4] example of affording 
deliberation is an obvious initial target. Do 
human agents perceive opportunities to make a 
decision? Does the concept of affordances for 
deliberation allow us to offer better explanations 
of when and how humans engage in explicit 
decision making? It certainly seems to fit with 
our phenomenology that situations afford 
deliberation: just as we experience a single open 
path as demanding to be walked down, we 
experience a fork in the path as demanding an 
act of explicit deliberation about which path to 
take. Although affordance-based theories are 
ultimately answerable to the empirical data, their 
phenomenological plausibility is responsible for 
a lot of their appeal [7]. If the notion of mental 
affordances tallies with our phenomenology, this 
would be a point in its favour. 
Moving beyond affordances for deliberation, we 
can explore the possibility of other affordances 
for mental action. I make a case for a range of 
possible affordances for mental actions, starting 
with some relatively innocuous proposals then 
building up to some more dramatic suggestions. 
First, I suggest that stimuli can afford covert 
attention. Since covert attention is a mental act, 
to afford covert attention is to afford a mental 
act. I suggest this holds even if all such stimuli 
also afford the bodily act of overtly attending. 
Second, I consider the possibility of stimuli 
affording offline bodily acts. The act of mental 
self-rotation, for instance, is an off-line 
counterpart to the bodily of act of moving one’s 
body around. In situations where subjects need 
to assess how things appear from another 
agent’s perspective, it has been established that 
they perform this act of mental self-rotation [8]. 
I consider whether this kind of situation can 
appropriately be described as affording mental 
self-rotation. Third, I consider the possibility 
that the environment can afford the performance 
of mathematical operations such as counting. I 
propose that the role of counting in certain 
mental disorders – specifically utilization 
behaviour [9] and OCD [10] – might fruitfully 
be explained in terms of a failure to suppress 
afforded mathematical activities. For each of 
these proposals, I explain how they might be 
investigated empirically. 
If it transpired that there were affordances for 
mental action, what would that teach us about 
the architecture of human behaviour? To 
perceive an affordance is to perceive an 
opportunity for action, and to perceive an 
opportunity for action is to reduce the level of 
complexity required in the processes mediating 
perception and behaviour. The need to minimise 
cognitive demands is something that AI 
engineers share with human evolutionary 
history. As such, we shouldn’t be surprised that 
the cognitive-shortcuts found in AI are mirrored 
in nature. 
Having made some provisional suggestions 
about how mental affordances might figure in 
human psychology, I then discuss how a broader 
conception of mental affordances might feed 
back into AI. In particular, I focus on the 
connection between an affordance-based 
architecture and exploration-based learning. If 
goal-independent ‘dabbling’ with external 
objects allows agents to learn the affordances for 
physical action offered by external objects [3], 
perhaps goal-independent dabbling with internal 
states will allow agents to learn the affordances 
for mental action offered by their own internal 
architecture. By freely exploring the effects of 
various internal manipulations, artificial agents 
may be able to discover strategies for deploying 
their cognitive capacities more effectively: 
discoveries that would be unavailable in a rule-
based meta-cognitive architecture. 
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